The study investigates the construct validity of a self-report questionnaire for dispositional sensitivity to befallen injustice (SB[," Schmitt, Neumann, and Montada, 1995 
lation of this construct follows from two lines of reasoning, which themselves are based on two general presumptions, one metatheoretical and the other substantive in nature.
The first, metatheoreticaI assumption starts out from the observation that social justice has traditionally been the domain of social psychologists. Research questions were mostly formulated from the viewpoint of general psychology and focused on situational determinants of behavior, Consequently, traditional research was almost exclusively experimental (cf. Berkowitz and Walster, 1976; Deutsch, 1985; Mikula, 1980 Mikula, , 1981 T6mblom, 1992) . With the exception of one eonstruct, belief in a just world (el. Furnham and Procter, 1989) , individual differences in personality, attitudes, values, and beliefs were deemed either uninteresting or unimportant. Given the large proportions of variance that have remained unexplained in experimental justice research, and given more or less incidental evidence on group differences in allocation behavior (e.g., Gerden et al., 1980) , scholars and research groups have become more and more interested in individual differences in justice attitudes and justice behavior. Measures for belief in a just world (e.g., Rubin and Peplau, 1973, 1975) , for attitudes toward principles of procedural justice (e.g., D6rfel, 1995), for centrality of justice as a value (e.g., Dalbert et al., 1987) , and for dispositional sensitivity to unjust own advantages (Montada et al., 1986) were developed and related to various psychological antecedents and consequences such as indicators for the secondary victimization of victims (e.g., Maes, 1994) and allocation behavior (e.g., Schmitt et al., 1994) . The lastmentioned construct, sensitivity to unjust personal advantages, is of special interest in the present context. In several studies it has been found that sensitivity to unjust personal advantages varies consistently between individuals, remains relatively stable across time, and predicts prosocial behavior toward the disadvantaged(e.g., Montada and Schneider, 1989) .
The second, substantive assumption draws upon the findings regarding sensitivity to unjust personal advantages. Justice judgments can be made from at least three perspectives: the perspective of the victim or unfairly disadvantaged, the perspective of the victimizer or unfairly privileged, and the perspective of the neutral outside observer or judge (Mikula, 1994) . If individuals differ in a traitlike manner regarding their sensitivity to injustice from the victimizer's perspective, similar traitlike individual differences may exist for the other two perspectives as well. Regarding the victim's perspective, a study by Dar and Resh (1993) provides first empirical evidence in support of this assumption. These authors found that sense of deprivation is generalized across type of resource (instrumental rewards, symbolic rewards, relational rewards), across reaction modes (judgments, feelings) and across contexts of deprivation (school, society).
